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STATE DETERMINATION AND STATE AUTONOMY IN
THEORIES OF REGIME MAINTENANCE AND REGIME CHANGE
James Cotton
For much of this century theories of state determination have held the upper hand in the
debate on the nature of the state. Both Marxism and pluralism, whatever their other
differences, have maintained that study of the state itself will only lead to a consideration
of other factors if its true mysteries are to be comprehended. In recent times, however, a
neo-Weberian counter-current has revived discussion of the possibility of the kind of state
autonomy assumed by the political historians of the past (Skocpol 1979; Evans et
al. 1985). This development has been helped by doubts about the state within the pluralist
tendency (e.g. Nordlinger 1981), both trends undoubtedly being in part responses to the
rise (against the expectations of conventional development theory) of authoritarian states
in the Third World and the success, apparently at the hands of 'strong' and 'hard' (and
therefore autonomous) states, of the industrialization of the Asian NICs (Amsden 1989;
Wade 1988).
As a result, theories of regime change, in which for a long time sociological or
economic factors predominated, are in transition. This transition is vividly expressed in
the influential work of O'Donnell, who has moved over two decades from a rather stark
regime determinism (bureaucratic-authoritarian theory) (O'Donnell 1973) to what
amounts almost to an embrace of the fortuitous (O'Donnell et al. 1986). The democrati
zation of (formerly autonomous) regimes in Latin America and Southern Europe was the
proximate impulse for the recent theorizing of O'Donnell and his co-authors; now the
apparent spread of the democratizing tendency to East Asia and Eastern Europe has
served to underline further the need to reconsider the conception of the state employed in
explanations of regime change.
Having clarified the meaning of the term 'state', this essay reviews the dependence of
the notion of regime change on prior understandings of the state. State determinists would
look outside the structures and individuals who make up the state in the search of those
factors which truly explain its transformation. Those more inclined to accord a degree of
autonomy to the state would look instead at the pressures and tensions at work on those
structures and individuals, as well as their conflicting interests and understandings. It is
argued here that in their extreme forms both of these approaches are too remote from
reality to be useful, though both identify possibilities and potentialities inherent in real
states. The actual state is a blend of autonomy and determination, and when analysing the
phenomenon of regime change, an approach to the state which ignores either of these
possibilities is inadequate as a guide for research.
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Government and state
The term 'state' should not be confused, as it tends to be in ordinary language, with the
term 'government'. The latter is here used to refer to holders of specific offices, usually
elected and thus (in the conventional sense) political figures. Members of parliamentary
executives and/or elected heads of state are thus the key members of any particular
government. A government is thus to be identified by formal-legal criteria (though such
criteria are sometimes satisfied ex post facto, as when coup makers set aside their uni
forms and assume more regular civilian offices). Such usage is largely consistent with the
everyday term 'government', except that this is often employed also to refer to subordi
nate offices in the administration, or to the sources of administrative policy whether
regarding major or minor matters.
By contrast, the term 'state' embraces all those individuals or office holders in
positions of 'authority' or effective power, the specific purpose of the offices they hold
being to make and/or see implemented policies binding upon all the members of the
society at large, and who may in the implementation of such policies have recourse to the
ultimate sanction of force. In addition to the government (as defined above), the state
therefore includes key members of the bureaucracy, ofjudicial and financial institutions,
and of the coercive and security organs. The activities of the state are normally coordi
nated by an executive and expressed through formal institutions; they are also both
constrained and informed by institutional memory in its various aspects (from archives to
deliberative procedures).
The criteria to be satisfied here are both empirical and formal-legal. In settled and
institutionalized political systems formal-legal criteria might well be the best guide to
formulating a hypothesis as to the membership of the 'state', but even in such cases only
studies of actual instances of policy-making (where they can be conducted) permit the
testing of such a hypothesis. To some extent this membership is bound to be fluid, as
different policy agendas are considered and personalities enter and leave crucial offices.
In less institutionalized systems the fact of state membership is likely to be somewhat
unclear, though in principle not unknowable.
In order for this term to be used coherently it is important that the institutional aspect
of the state be taken seriously. If this requirement is ignored membership of the state is
enlarged (by definition, as it were, rather than as a result of empirical enquiry) to embrace
articulators of economic and social interests, and influence wielders of every variety.
Such a notion of the state is amorphous, and prejudges the issue of the possibility of the
effective independent power and interests of state formations (an independence seem
ingly manifest in the history of states from Chinggis Khan to Park Chung Hee). At the
same time, the possibility of any given state lacking independent power should not be
excluded.
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Regime and regime change
In everyday language, the term 'regime' is used to refer to two distinct though sometimes
related phenomena: on the one hand, the particular personnel in charge of a state (as in
'the Noriega regime', 'the Marcos regime', 'the Thatcher regime'), on the other, the type
of ruling that occurs in the state (thus, 'an absolutist regime', 'an authoritarian regime').
As a consequence, at this level the notion of regime change refers to a heterogeneous
range of occurrences. Changes in the leading personnel in the state may or may not,
depending on the existence or otherwise of pertinent conventions, be explicable in terms
of constitutional processes. Transitions from authoritarian to liberal systems, or from one
type of authoritarianism to another (which again usually but may not coincide with
personnel changes), are clearly political changes of another (and more significant) kind.
Now without engaging in an extended discussion, it can be maintained that the focus
appropriate to political science is that of offices and the structures within which they are
embedded, rather than that of individuals. Given what has been said of 'government'
above, mere changes of personnel unaccompanied by other major changes in the political
system are better characterized as 'changes of government': 'regime' and 'regime
change' should be reserved respectively for the character and transformation of features
of greater moment for the political system.
To begin with the first of these, here the term 'regime' is taken to refer to the character
of the rule of the state. Thus the pattern of relations (including understandings and even
ideologies) which link members of the state and which is manifest in the relationship
between state and society is central to the understanding of any given regime.
This, of course, is not the only way in which this term has been employed. Fishman,
for example, has suggested that both regime and state could be used to refer primarily to
personnel, with the latter restricted to individuals and office-holders who wield substan
tive power (though a wider group than the 'government') as opposed to those who merely
exercise formal and administrative office (Fishman 1990). Similarly, Calvert has charac
terized regime continuity as a situation where 'power remains essentially in the hands of
the same social group' (Calvert 1987:18). The difficulty with this usage is that the
character of ruling found in any given political system is not to be comprehended (as
Aristotle, Montesquieu and others understood) solely in terms of who wields effective
power. As Fishman also notes, 'the distinction between democracy, totalitarianism, and
authoritarianism ... deals with the question of regime type' (Fishman 1990:428). It is plain
that this kind ofdistinction is principally about modes and practices of ruling, which is the
focus of the approach of this essay.
In traditional discourse, the discussion of regime type was generally concerned with
domestic politics (though even for the ancient world the rule of the hegemon, as exempli
fied in Philip of Macedon's domination of most of the Greek states, was understood in
part as referring to 'international' relationships). However it should be noted here that
'regime' has become a term of art in recent international relations theory, though the
actual usage of the term indicates that there is no generally agreed meaning within that
theory. Keohane and Nye suggest that such a regime consists of 'networks of rules, norms
and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects' (Keohane and Nye
1977:19), a usage which has some parallels with that suggested here for regimes in
domestic politics.
The Aristotelian notion of 'constitution' is perhaps close to the understanding of
regime being advanced, although of course this affinity does not bind its use either to
Aristotle's (limited) typology or measure of regimes. Aristotle recognized seven regimes,
using as his two standards the number of rulers and the interest in which they chose to
rule. There are some parallels here, too, with the Weberian preoccupation with authority
types and institutional principles, though again this does not constrain the view to a
repetition of Weber.
This characterization of regime has a number of implications for notions of regime
type. Clearly, many types of regime are possible, and the degree of autonomy or
determination of a given state formation would provide one important index or analytical
construct through which to interpret and characterize regime type. However, this analysis
implies that there are limiting conditions to this autonomy and determination. Weber's
'Sultanism' on the one hand (Weber 1978:231) and extreme libertarianism or anarchy on
the other are both conditions in which the state is either almost incidental to a given
population, territory, or interests, or alternatively, virtually coterminous with all the
inhabitants of the territory. 'Determination' and 'autonomy' are both, therefore, relative
terms. Relativity may be understood in more than one sense: a separate notion of 'relative
autonomy' will be discussed below.
The point should be underlined that reference to the condition of autonomy and
determination alone will not provide anything approaching an adequate taxonomy of
regimes. Such reference alludes, in a sense, to a 'meta-category' with reference to which
empirical enquiry on actual regimes should be conducted. But it can be maintained that
this distinction lies behind or is implicit in many practical categorizations of regime type,
whether understood in these or different terms (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman 1989:58-60).
Indeed, Montesquieu's distinction between the republic (more or less virtuous) and
despotism can be seen in this light, although Montesquieu (consistent with his age) also
admitted the existence of a third type of system, the monarchy.
'Regime change' implies the supplanting of one regime type and its substitution by
another. This may coincide with a change of government or even of many of the (wider
category of the) personnel of the state, but neither is necessarily entailed. Political reform
or transformation, for example, may provide (as in the case of Disraeli or Hider or Roh
Tae-woo) a new foundation or grounding for the political power of an existing govern
ment or political movement. Practically speaking, however, such changes of personnel
often accompany and are entailed by regime change.
If changes in personnel are not absolutely crucial to regime change, what is? Again an
element of policy awareness is required. An existing regime may be characterized in
terms of the effective power of particular offices and office-holders and institutions. Their
scope for initiative, the interests they consult, their policy agenda and the role of ideology
and similar determinants therein, all make up an identifiable pattern. When this pattern is
disturbed or disrupted, we may expect regime change to have occurred.
On this view, regime maintenance implies the persistence of the pattern of relations
(including understandings), or the existing 'constitution' in the Aristotelian sense identi
fied above, peculiar to a given regime. Again the continuance in office of individual
office-holders is not crucial to such persistence, but the continuity of the powers and
scope (and limitations) of their offices is essential
State determination
For the state thus understood, theories of its determination come in various forms.
Pluralism and the Marxian interpretation of the class nature of the state are probably the
best known variants. For the pluralists, the state is the arena within which the interests of
the society come together, or the agency that realizes the dominant view of what policies
and goals should be pursued by the society at large. The term 'interests' has a specialized
meaning here since it is assumed that such interests are in principle reconcilable, nor are
they dominated by single issues or the expression of dominant class and social stratifica
tion differences. For Marx, as far as his view of the modern stale was concerned, it was
simply the mechanism for realizing the common aims of the bourgeoisie. Once again
'interest' has a particular meaning, it being assumed in this case that in the long run, the
bourgeoisie (and indeed other classes) would have an identifiable and understood com
mon interest.
Dependency theories, and the particular variant known as bureaucratic-authoritarian
theory, are also examples of state determination theory. The determining factor may be
understood as social (the influence of classes or relatively exclusionary social interests) or
as economic (the world system, the economic strategy or predicament of the polity
concerned, or the hegemony of the regime in which the polity is located exercising a
crucial influence). However these determining factors are located or identified, it is clear
that the powers and limitations of the state are presented as attributable to developments
external (whether national or transnational) to the state itself.
Insofar as ethnic or ethnonationalist theories of the state comprise a coherent ap
proach to state analysis, they may also be taken as examples of state determination theory.
At various times the states in Malaysia, Nepal, Burma (Myanmar) as well as a number in
post-colonial Africa have been adduced as examples in conformity with this approach.
From the sociological perspective, the political culture approach (as expounded by,
say, Lucian Pye [1985]) may be seen as a further example of state determination, though
in this case any given government is a kind of logical emanation of the larger society, and
thus (willy-nilly) the bearer of its values and outlooks. Some political culture exponents,
of course, would limit its application to certain cases rather than see it as a universally
valid approach. From the perspective of political actors and institutions, however, the
political culture view may be consistent with the notion of state autonomy. To take the
example of an allegedly 'Confucian' state: on the former view, Confucianism may be
regarded as a form of ethical determinism (prescribing goals and a pattern of conduct
which leave little room for dissent or manoeuver) whereas on the latter, it may be seen
instead as a rationalization for moral autonomy and political activism (on the part, at least,
of the gentlemen of education).
Relative state autonomy
The notion of 'relative state autonomy' has been given a special meaning by those writing
from within the Marxist school (e.g Block 1 977). Although committed to a long-run view
that a coherent class interest is bound to emerge to dominate the state, Marxists have long
had to contend with a real world which seems at variance with this expectation. In his
various writings on French politics, from Louis Bonaparte to the Commune, Marx made
two suggestions which have been taken up by subsequent Marxists to explain (or excuse)
the absence in many cases of the unvarnished 'class rule' which Marx's theory seems to
require. On the one hand, Marx notes divisions within the French bourgeoisie or owners
of capital —between the finance bourgeoisie, the industrial bourgeoisie, and so on. Such
divisions may apparently give the state independent power. On the other, he does concede
that in some (rather particular) circumstances, (he state may pursue its own interest
without needing to take into account the interests of the classes in the society at large.
The problem with this approach is that the intention of introducing this notion is to
explain why that which is inevitable has been for the moment delayed. It is therefore an
example of the strategy labelled by Popper as 'saving the hypothesis' (Popper 1966). To
put it another way, the danger is that Marxists may confuse the permanent or long-term
with the temporary. This theoretical stratagem has not been entirely unfruitful as far as
empirical studies are concerned, giving rise, for example, to Nora Hamilton's book on
Mexico (Hamilton 1983) and other useful studies. However, if state autonomy is a distinct
variant of theorizing about the state, this approach is somewhat different.
State autonomy
Given the familiarity of the state determination positions discussed above, it is worth
considering the alternative view in greater detail. To underline a point made above, state
' autonomy ' is always relative. Even if the members of the state are united in their pursuit
of a particular set of goals, and have command of extensive resources and a willing
population, the capacity of a state is always limited, either absolutely or in terms of
relations with other states. Less obvious but still important are the limitations imposed by
outlook (including ideology and religion) and yet other factors.
Taking the presence of such limitations as given, then, state autonomy implies that
the members of the state as defined above are capable of significant action unchecked by
domestic or external interests. Nordlinger (1981) has discerned a number of dimensions
in such autonomy, but the most important distinction for comparative politics relates to
the ends for which autonomous action is employed. A state which acts to protect its
perquisites but otherwise governs according to some more-or-less widely affirmed view
of the common interest is probably not a rare phenomenon (as analysts of bureaucracy
from Bentham onwards have noted). But the state which seeks not merely to preserve but
even to enhance its power while overseeing rapid economic or social change is another.
Indeed, if the tasks and role of the state include the achieving of more-or-less rapid
social and economic transformation especially through the creation of new forms of
economic activity, and new classes and strata, attention to this task might provide one test
for the presence of state autonomy. In this category of states might be included Meiji
Japan, Turkey under Kemal (Trimberger 1978), Stalin's Russia, Singapore under Lee
Kuan Yew, and South Korea under Park Chung Hee. Although these are all modern
states, the idea of state autonomy has a long history. In the Western tradition, Plato,
Machiavelli, and Weber could be regarded as having been preoccupied with this issue. In
Eastern political thought it has been the majority view, including among its adherents
Confucius and Kautilya, Han Fei Tzu and Sun Yat-sea
State autonomy implies therefore that the political system has been sufficiently
insulated from adverse pressures and forces to facilitate centralized policy-making,
usually by bureaucrats. The form of the state autonomy hypothesis varies depending on
whether the institutional or classAnterest aspect of this autonomy is emphasized (Deyo
1987:228ff). Thus 'autonomy' is understood as having been possible cither because the
directing institutions were or are free from non-development-oriented interference
(Johnson 1987) or because the state was unbeholden to any particular social force and
interest or represented a small and exclusive social coalition and thus was free to chart a
development-oriented course. In addition, those historically opposed to industrialization
were either rigorously controlled (through policies of corporatism for labour or other
groups) or undermined socially and politically (as, for example, landlords by land reform
programmes); and important intellectual or organizational influences may have been
instrumental in setting the state on a path conducive to autonomy: American assistance
with land reform in Taiwan and with plans for export-led industrialization in Korea, or
British and French notions of socialism as applied by some post-colonial African elites, or
(to take a less well-known case) the corporate planning of the Shell Oil Company in
Brunei (Leake 1989), might be taken as post-war examples. Finally, the successful
autonomous state must possess, in its society, strata and particularly elites whose
energies can be channelled or expertise called upon (the samurai in Japan, the military in
Latin America) in effecting change.
To advert again briefly to international relations theory, Krasner argues that regimes
can be regarded as 'variables' intervening between social and economic factors and the
policy outcomes of states (Krasner 1982) — an approach which might be considered to
accord at least partial autonomy to such regimes — though he recognizes that a view of
regimes which understands them as more-or-less determined phenomena can also be
defended.
State theory, regime maintenance and regime change
So far we have been concerned to distinguish theories of state determination and theories
of state autonomy. The former generally maintain that in important respects the character
of the state is to be explained only with reference to external factors, the latter usually
emphasizing the independent capacity of the state to pursue at least its own interest if not
some wider transformative vision. It is important to note here that the methodological
status of these theories is not always directly comparable. Theories of state determination
usually presume that the state is bound to be a secondary social form. As has been shown,
this position is most clearly adopted in classical Marxism, but even some pluralists (for
example, those partial to functional or systems analysis) are not inclined to see the state as
anything but a determined phenomenon. Perhaps taking their cue from Weber, the state
autonomy school are more likely to accept the historical specificity of their principal
hypothesis, though again like Weber this school tends to assume that state autonomy,
once in existence, is as much a fact of the modern world as bureaucracy.
State determinationists, then, would attribute regime change to changes in the sub
strata (however understood) of the state. Attitudinal, class, ethnic, economic or interna
tional changes are seen to impel appropriate changes in regime form. Similarly, regime
maintenance is attributed to the persistence of these factors. State autonomy theory, on the
other hand, would emphasize in the explanation of regime change, institutional and
organizational factors, and/or the influence of changing outlooks, personnel, and ideolo
gies. Correspondingly, regime maintenance would be seen as the consequence of the
general acceptance of, or lack of, challenges to the exisiting pattern of office-holding and
policy-making.
The connection between state theory and regime change theory is well illustrated in
the work of O'Donnell. Having long defended the bureaucratic-authoritarian view of the
NIC state, and thus held that regime change was to be attributed to the economic policies
forced upon the ruling 'pact of domination' by the exhaustion of the economic strategy of
import-substitution industrialization, O'Donnell seems to have abandoned both views. At
any rate, regime change of the kind with which he has been more recently concerned (the
redemocratization of authoritarian forms) is attributed On the context of economic dislo
cation) both to divisions within the ruling group, to calculation and miscalculation on their
part as well as on the part of opposition forces, to bold individual strategies and examples,
and to sheer chance. He has also stressed the re-emergence of a historically pre-exisiting
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civil society. Such a list of conditions is both miscellaneous and methodologically
heterogeneous, though no point made in this connection is inherently implausible.
O'Donnell's hesitancy to describe these cases of democratization as unambiguous ex
amples of the opening of previously exclusionary systems to popular forces and opinion
(he makes much of the fact that by timely concessions more far-sighted members of
authoritarian elites have sought to preserve remnants of their power) suggests further that
he has embraced something of the state autonomy approach (Levine 1988). Even demo
cratic forms have not opened elites in these states to full public scrutiny or accountability.
From theory to analysis
Away from the realm of theory, the student of comparative politics is confronted with the
realization that both of these theories (or, more appropriately, hypotheses) are, as Nettl
has argued (Nettl 1967-68), variables, and related variables at that. No concrete state (as
defined above) is either a total epiphenomenon or alternatively the bedrock of all political
relations. Part of the business of explaining regime change is therefore to characterize it as
a movement from (relative) autonomy towards determination, or vice versa, or alterna
tively to account for regime change which occurs without the state experiencing any
appreciable variation in its position on the autonomy-determination dimension. Until any
particular state can be firmly located on the autonomy-determination continuum, the
appropriateness of any given approach to its characteristics and peculiarities cannot be
established. It follows that comparativist analysis of regime change (and regime mainte
nance) is bound to be methodologically untidy.
If the two approaches to the state which have been the subject of this essay are
considered as a dimension or continuum, then, four types of regime change are possible.
These are set out in the diagram below. A regime change which occurs without a
concomitant change in the relative autonomy or determination of the state in question is
labelled as a 'continuous' regime change. A 'discontinuous' change is one in which a
given regime change is accompanied or occasioned by a change in the state's relative
autonomy or determination.
REGIME CHANGE MATRIX
continuous discontinuous
stale autonomy A—> A A—>D
state determination D—> D D—>A
The trend to democratization not only in Latin America and Southern Europe but also
in the Asian NICs, where it is often alleged that new middle classes have emerged to
contest political offices that until recently were under the monopoly of more-or-less
closed elites, underlines the importance of this perspective. If the rise of the middle
classes in South Korea and Taiwan is taken as an established fact, political changes in
both of these systems since 1986 might be regarded as cases of 'discontinuous' regime
change in which a formerly autonomous state changes to incorporate important conces
sions to determination (A->D in the matrix). A differing interpretation of these two cases
will be discussed below. Similarly, insofar as O'Donnell and his co-authors are correct to
discern a re-emergence in recent times of civil society in Latin America (especially in
Chile, Argentina, and Brazil), this categorization of regime change may also be applicable
there. Finally, the democratization of Nepal in 1989, though emerging from a different
social context, could further be placed in this same category—a category evidently with a
large and diverse membership.
There would appear to be a number of examples of the reverse of this movement. The
original emergence of authoritarian systems in Latin America, the failure of democracy in
Indonesia of the 1950s, the rise of fascism in Italy (perhaps the triumph of militarism in
Japan), could all be taken as instances of discontinuous regime charge, in which a
formerly (relatively) determined state takes on a greater degree of autonomy (D->A in the
matrix).
Cases of 'continuous' regime change, on the other hand, would include some
instances of one authoritarianism giving way to another. In the modem period, the
transition in Indonesia from Sukarno to Suharto or in China from the Kuomintang to the
Communist Party, where ideology and policy preferences show a marked and rapid
transformation, could be maintained to be prominent examples of this type (A->A in the
matrix). In the ancient and medieval worlds, such transitions were more common (from
the Qin to the Mongols in China, from the Archaemenids to Alexander or the Byzantines
to the Seljuks and the Ottomans in the Near East).
'Continuous' regime change occurring in a more-or-less determined state (D->D in
the matrix) is clearly a comparatively rare phenomenon. This is so because if the
constellation of forces (whether understood in class or interest terms) in which the state is
embedded are strong enough to be dominant over a period of time, only a significant
social upheaval or rapid attitude and interest change would leave the state unresponsive.
Nevertheless, a 'determined' state, particularly one where the determination in question
was not fully formalized in liberal democratic institutions, existing in a society in which
deep divisions of interest and attitude were present, could conceivably undergo such
regime change (if these pressures did not precipitate a civil war, as for example in the
United States in the 19th century, or modem Lebanon). It should be recalled that, to some
observers at the time, the United Kingdom in 1945 appeared to be undergoing such a
regime change, and in retrospect, the shift from Marcos to Aquino in the Philippines
might also be seen thus. Almost a separate instance would be that of a state in which
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domestic forces were displaced by significant external power, or one external power (with
a different ideology or view of policy) replaced another as the most important influence
over essential decisions (as in the case of Cuba before Castro and after his rise to power).
Regime change and 'democratization'
This last observation leads to the suggestion that the phenomenon of democratization, the
fundamental likeness of which has been assumed (especially by popular American
commentators) in instances from Latin America to Eastern Europe to East Asia, needs to
be reassessed.
Thus, on first examination, the democratization offormer socialist systems ofEastern
Europe might appear to be examples of the process of discontinuous regime change in
which a formerly autonomous state takes on significant elements of determination in
response to the rise of new classes or interests or the emergence (or re-emergence) of
elements of civil society (A->D). That is to say, Eastern Europe may be seen as a further
instance of that process already observed in Latin America and East Asia. However, if the
focus of study is the state as defined above, it is an empirical question (and could well vary
from case to case) the extent to which these systems have become transformed in this
way.
On one interpretation (which seems most applicable to the Polish case) it was indeed
a loss of nerve on the part of the state authorities accompanied by the reassertion and
resurgence ofcivil society which accounted for the collapse of the former state autonomy.
On the other interpretation (which is perhaps most applicable to the Hungarian case),
though the state was already in a condition of decay, the crucial factor in its rapid eclipse
was the Soviet abrogation of the Brezhnev doctrine as indicated by Gorbachev 's response
to the crisis in East Germany. In other words, we may have here an example or examples
of continuous regime change in which the state remains determined rather than
autonomous but with an external determination being replaced by domestic determination
(and therefore in the D->D category). This observation underlines the importance of
comparative study of these phenomena. And of course in the case of Romania and the
Serbian republic of Yugoslavia, we have yet to see the occurrence of genuine regime
change. Nor, to consider further the Yugoslavian example, is it clear how the movement
towards democratization is to be understood. To take the case of Slovenia, where
democratization has proceeded furthest, it is a moot point whether the growth of
democratic political organizations in the republic itself or the failure of the (formerly
Serbian-dominated) Belgrade authorities to impose discipline from the centre was the
more important determinant of this democratization.
The theoretical heterogeneity of the notion of democratization thus demonstrated
prompts additional reflections on the East Asian cases already mentioned. It is undoubt
edly true that mass action between April and June 1987 forced the Chun Doo-hwan
government in Korea to relinquish those constitutional practices which helped to guaran
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tee state autonomy. However, subsequent political developments — first the continued
division of the opposition forces, and then in 1990 the formation of a grand coalition of
governing and former opposition groups — suggest that the possibilities opened up in the
earlier period for the creation of wider mechanisms of state determination were not
grasped. The process in Taiwan has been largely comparable, except that political power
is being inherited not by a new coalition of forces but by a new configuration of factions
within the same ruling party. Whether the continuity of the political culture or some more
particular factors explain these developments, there are some grounds for interpreting
these cases of apparent 'democratization' as examples of continuous regime change in an
autonomous state (A->A in the matrix).
Conclusion
Discussions of regime change require, first of all, some precision as to the use of key
terms, lest every change of government (in the sense of leading personnel) becomes a
change of regime. Without prejudging the issue of (or the degree of) state or institutional
autonomy, it has been suggested here that the term state be understood in terms of office
holding in a broad sense. Further, a coherent view of regime change should be seen as
implying a change in the character of ruling, a change probably best mirrored in the state's
policy predilections and revealed preferences. Putting these two strategies together in the
structuring of any discussion of regime change in actual states has been held to require a
recognition of what is perhaps the most important divide in social and political theory,
that being between those who see the state as (relatively) determined and those who
maintain its actual (or potential) autonomy. Interpreting this divide as an empirical rather
than a methodological difference, four possible types of regime change have conse
quently been identified: regime change which accompanies the transition from autono
mous to determined state or vice versa, or regime change which occurs within the
parameters of a state formation which is either continuously determined or autonomous.
Though this does not exhaust the factors relevant to a discussion of regime change, it
provides a typology which isolates significantly different cases. In particular it may be
used to clarify the much discussed but somewhat heterogeneous phenomenon of democ
ratization.
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